Ten years ago, few people could have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has done. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) was launched shortly after Nato’s war in Kosovo in 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises without depending on the United States. The question is: has the EU succeeded?

Against a turbulent strategic backdrop of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ESDP has not generated many international headlines – except when there have been disagreements between governments, for example over the EU-Nato relationship. It has also become commonplace to associate ESDP with a failure to strengthen Europe’s military prowess. But a closer look at EU operations shows it has been more successful than is often reported, not least because complex security challenges cannot be tackled using only military means.

Civil and military resources

The EU has initiated some 23 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia since 2003, using both civil and military resources. Nato, in contrast, only has access to military means. Six of the 23 EU operations have been military missions; the other 17 have deployed police, border guards, monitors, judges, and administrators. Their tasks have included countering organised crime in Kosovo, reforming the Congolese army, and monitoring the Rafah crossing point in Gaza.

Some EU operations have had impressive results. When the UN was unable to protect civilians from militias in Congo in 2003, an EU military intervention stopped mass atrocities inIturi. The 2005 monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia oversaw the implementation of a peace agreement, ending 29 years of conflict between Jakarta and rebel groups. The 2008 peacekeeping operation in Chad protected over 400,000 displaced persons and refugees fleeing from the Darfur conflict.

True, EU operations have been relatively small in size compared with Nato and UN missions – the largest was a 7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (which now numbers 2,200). But what if they had never existed in the first place? The 2003 military operation in the former Yugoslav republic Macedonia helped prevent a potential civil war in that country and cost only 6.2 million euros, compared with 4.3 billion euros for Nato’s war in Kosovo.

A convergence of member state interests

EU missions have been most effective when there has been a clear convergence of member state interests. The current EU monitoring mission in Georgia is a case in point. It was deployed only weeks after the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, and shows the political determination of EU member states can translate into a mission that makes a difference on the ground. The rapid EU deployment ensured that the ceasefire between Georgia and Russia held, when no other international actor could intervene.

The power of political will also explains the decision to launch the current naval operation off the coasts of Somalia to fight piracy, protect trade routes and enable the delivery of humanitarian aid. Over the last year the EU has deterred several pirate attacks and handed over 68 pirates to the Kenyan authorities for prosecution, while 267,000 metric tonnes of food aid have been delivered to Somalia under EU protection.

Of course, EU operations have sometimes experienced real difficulties, such as a lack of qualified civilian personnel or adequate military equipment. For example, EU governments have only sent 225 police out of 400 authorised for their training mission in Afghanistan. It took a full six months for EU governments to find only 16 helicopters and 10 transport planes for their peacekeeping operation in Chad. Plus, from Congo to Afghanistan, the coordination of ESDP operations with other European efforts, such as aid projects managed by the European Commission or national programmes for reforming local security forces, needs to improve.

An indispensable part of maintaining international security

The Lisbon treaty should help overcome some of these shortcomings. The ‘external action service’ proposed in the treaty should join up the diplomatic and military power that the member states co-ordinate through the EU Council with the development assistance, state- building and reconstruction funds of the European Commission. Plus, the new high representative for EU foreign policy will be both a vice-president of the Commission and chair the EU foreign ministers council. This should help ensure that EU action really delivers results in difficult theatres, and that national policies are consistent with EU goals.

Ultimately, while the Lisbon reforms would help, the future success of ESDP will depend on the commitment of EU governments. They have much to build upon. Compared with 1999, even sceptics are forced to admit that ESDP has become an indispensable part of maintaining international security. As EU official and strategic thinker, Robert Cooper, has written: no EU operation has saved the world, but they have saved lives. Based on its first decade, there is every reason to believe ESDP will be even more indispensable by 2019.